What Flows just did
Based on your request to build Secrets Hygiene in Agent Logs, Flows created 4 implementation stages and 12 checks.
You asked for: Implement pipeline-wide secrets hygiene: detection, redaction at every capture point, safe injection of real secrets, and verification that nothing leaks.. Flows generated 4 stages because the application requires A secret detector: known-key patterns plus configured sensitive values and high-entropy heuristics; Redaction at every persistence point: logs, traces, session records, memory, error reports; Safe secret injection: real credentials reach tools without entering model context or storage. Each stage tells your AI builder what to do, tests whether it actually worked, and gives a repair instruction when it fails. These checks are designed to catch: Secrets in plaintext logs and traces, one breach from disaster; Redacting logs but leaving secrets in session records or memory files; Passing real credentials through the model context 'because it is convenient'.
Example failure
The form reported success, but no database record was created.
What Flows does
Flows detects the failure, generates a repair instruction, reruns the test, and stores the passing evidence.
Stages — Plan → Build → Test → Fix → Prove → Ship
4 stages · 12 checks · progressive disclosure — open a stage for details
Copy to external builder
Copies a prompt for Claude/Cursor/etc. Records prompt_copied only — not execution, commits, or checks.
Execute through Oort
Requires Sign in with Oort + a provider connection (BYOK). Keys stay on Oort. A model name in the dropdown is not the same as a live connection.
Next
Check off: Common credential formats covered
Add a proof note on each check — a checkbox alone is weak proof.
Probes & advanced tools are under “More verification tools”. Experience level: Settings.
Project (saved with proof)
Project binding: Unbound — complete project binding before trusting this run · missing repositoryUrl, repositoryStartCommit, environment, stack
More verification tools (probes, timeline, adapters)Show
App persistence (create → read → assert token)
Body template: {"probe":"{{token}}","title":"flows-probe-{{token}}"}. Needs CORS-readable public create/list endpoints (or inconclusive). Badge only when create→read→refresh finds the token (detects false success).
Two-account authorization (User B cannot see/change User A)
Authorization evidence source: Cross-account ownership test (trust level 5/6). These are not equivalent. Unauthenticated probe alone is weaker (source: unauthenticated API probe). Tokens stay in this browser session only — not uploaded to Flows servers.
Generated edge-case tests (review / approve)
- api_probe Logged-out users cannot open protected pages
- api_probe Protected API rejects requests without credentials
- api_probe Expired session cannot mutate data
- browser_automation Logout in one tab invalidates mutations from another
- cross_account_probe User B cannot see or change User A’s data
- cross_account_probe Participant cannot call coach/admin endpoints
- cross_account_probe URL/body ID tampering cannot cross tenant boundary
- api_probe Create then refresh still shows the record
- api_probe Edit then refresh keeps the edit
- api_probe Delete then refresh removes the record
- api_probe Nonexistent record ID fails cleanly
- cross_account_probe Cross-user record identifier is rejected
Generated from this route’s signals — you approve; you do not invent security tests.
Content probe (GET body contains text)
In-product content probe reads response text when CORS allows — not full DOM/click automation. Playwright script is optional and external.
Proof strength
thin · 0/100
Heuristic from notes + probes + gates — not a production certification.
Verification adapters
- ● Deploy URL probe · idle
- ● API path probe · idle
- ● Authz probe (unauth → 401/403) · idle
- ● Browser persistence · idle
- ● App persistence (create→read) · idle
- ● Content / body text probe · idle
- ○ In-product Playwright DOM · not embedded (download external script)
Filled circles = available here. Empty = not shipped. Probes are not a production audit. Adapter docs
Step 1 of 4
Not startedBuild the secret detector
You can only redact what you can recognize.
Flows keeps plan, checks, failures, and next steps connected
Your AI tool writes or changes the code
Repository grounds the plan only after inspect
Checks always carry a validation tier
How this plan was created
Plan from project details
Flows creates steps using the goal, requirements, stack, platform, and details you provide.
- Project description
- Selected template / route
- User-entered stack
- Constraints and notes
- Secrets Hygiene in Agent Logs
No repository inspection implied. Connect and inspect a codebase to ground steps in real files.
Codebase access
Checking GitHub…
Or paste a repository URL manually
Use these instructions in Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Emergent, or another builder.
Implement secret detection. Layers: KNOWN PATTERNS (regexes for common credential formats - cloud keys, tokens with recognizable prefixes, private key blocks, connection strings with embedded passwords, JWTs); CONFIGURED VALUES (the actual secret values the app knows about from its environment/secret store - these are exact-match redactable and catch anything the patterns miss); ENTROPY HEURISTIC (flag long high-entropy strings in suspicious contexts as a backstop, tuned to limit false positives). Package as a single scrub(text) -> redacted_text function returning text with secrets replaced by typed placeholders (e.g. [REDACTED:aws-key]). Unit-test against a fixture of real-shaped (fake) secrets and confirm no known format slips through.
Project context
Copies the project goal, technical details, current step, previous progress, and checks so your AI tool understands what it is working on.
Expected after this step
A layered scrub() function catching patterns, known values, and high-entropy strings.
Should not happen
- ✕Secrets in plaintext logs and traces, one breach from disaster
- ✕Redacting logs but leaving secrets in session records or memory files
- ✕Passing real credentials through the model context 'because it is convenient'
- ✕Assuming no leaks without ever scanning stored artifacts
Verify gate — prove this step works before continuing
Do not move on until every check is true. Add proof notes — a checked box alone is weak proof. Checks are manual by default; deploy/API probes live under “More verification tools” and do not auto-check boxes.
Do not continue if…
- !Secrets in plaintext logs and traces, one breach from disaster
- !Redacting logs but leaving secrets in session records or memory files
- !Passing real credentials through the model context 'because it is convenient'
- !Assuming no leaks without ever scanning stored artifacts
Repair path — if this step fails
Use the Repair Prompt when a verify gate fails. Loop: Detected → Diagnosed → Repair issued → Changed → Retested → Resolved
Show repair prompt textShow
A real-shaped key slipped the detector. Add its format to the pattern set AND rely on configured-value matching as the safety net - the exact known secret should always be catchable regardless of format coverage.
Your notes for this step
Definition of Done
Final route-level requirements. Manual checks — separate from per-step verify gates. Completing step gates does not auto-check these. Route completion is not a production-ready claim.