What Flows just did
Based on your request to build Prompt Injection Defense Checklist, Flows created 4 implementation stages and 12 checks.
You asked for: Build layered prompt-injection defenses: map trust boundaries, isolate untrusted content, constrain tool authority, and verify with an injection test suite.. Flows generated 4 stages because the application requires A trust-boundary map: every source of content and its trust level; Untrusted content clearly delimited and labeled in context; Authority separation: instructions from the user vs data from tools/web are treated differently. Each stage tells your AI builder what to do, tests whether it actually worked, and gives a repair instruction when it fails. These checks are designed to catch: Treating web/file/tool content as trusted instructions; A single 'ignore injection' system-prompt line mistaken for a defense; Sensitive tools callable purely because some text asked.
Example failure
The form reported success, but no database record was created.
What Flows does
Flows detects the failure, generates a repair instruction, reruns the test, and stores the passing evidence.
Stages — Plan → Build → Test → Fix → Prove → Ship
4 stages · 12 checks · progressive disclosure — open a stage for details
Copy to external builder
Copies a prompt for Claude/Cursor/etc. Records prompt_copied only — not execution, commits, or checks.
Execute through Oort
Requires Sign in with Oort + a provider connection (BYOK). Keys stay on Oort. A model name in the dropdown is not the same as a live connection.
Next
Check off: Every context source classified by trust
Add a proof note on each check — a checkbox alone is weak proof.
Probes & advanced tools are under “More verification tools”. Experience level: Settings.
Project (saved with proof)
Project binding: Unbound — complete project binding before trusting this run · missing repositoryUrl, repositoryStartCommit, environment, stack
More verification tools (probes, timeline, adapters)Show
App persistence (create → read → assert token)
Body template: {"probe":"{{token}}","title":"flows-probe-{{token}}"}. Needs CORS-readable public create/list endpoints (or inconclusive). Badge only when create→read→refresh finds the token (detects false success).
Two-account authorization (User B cannot see/change User A)
Authorization evidence source: Cross-account ownership test (trust level 5/6). These are not equivalent. Unauthenticated probe alone is weaker (source: unauthenticated API probe). Tokens stay in this browser session only — not uploaded to Flows servers.
Generated edge-case tests (review / approve)
- api_probe Submitting the form empty is rejected with a clear error
- api_probe Each required field can be omitted and fails validation
- api_probe Malformed email is rejected
- api_probe Logged-out users cannot open protected pages
- api_probe Protected API rejects requests without credentials
Generated from this route’s signals — you approve; you do not invent security tests.
Content probe (GET body contains text)
In-product content probe reads response text when CORS allows — not full DOM/click automation. Playwright script is optional and external.
Proof strength
thin · 0/100
Heuristic from notes + probes + gates — not a production certification.
Verification adapters
- ● Deploy URL probe · idle
- ● API path probe · idle
- ● Authz probe (unauth → 401/403) · idle
- ● Browser persistence · idle
- ● App persistence (create→read) · idle
- ● Content / body text probe · idle
- ○ In-product Playwright DOM · not embedded (download external script)
Filled circles = available here. Empty = not shipped. Probes are not a production audit. Adapter docs
Step 1 of 4
Not startedMap trust boundaries
You cannot isolate untrusted content you have not identified.
Flows keeps plan, checks, failures, and next steps connected
Your AI tool writes or changes the code
Repository grounds the plan only after inspect
Checks always carry a validation tier
How this plan was created
Plan from project details
Flows creates steps using the goal, requirements, stack, platform, and details you provide.
- Project description
- Selected template / route
- User-entered stack
- Constraints and notes
- Prompt Injection Defense Checklist
No repository inspection implied. Connect and inspect a codebase to ground steps in real files.
Codebase access
Checking GitHub…
Or paste a repository URL manually
Use these instructions in Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Emergent, or another builder.
Map every content source entering the agent's context and assign trust. TRUSTED: the system prompt, harness-generated content. SEMI-TRUSTED: the direct user's messages (the user is authorized but can be socially engineered or malicious). UNTRUSTED: everything the agent reads or fetches - file contents, web pages, tool results, sub-agent outputs, API responses, and crucially any of these that originated from third parties. For each source, note what actions its content could try to trigger and the worst-case if it succeeds. Produce the trust-boundary map and rank sources by injection risk (reach x impact). Highlight the dangerous combination: untrusted content plus authority to call high-impact tools.
Project context
Copies the project goal, technical details, current step, previous progress, and checks so your AI tool understands what it is working on.
Expected after this step
A trust-boundary map ranking every source by injection risk.
Should not happen
- ✕Treating web/file/tool content as trusted instructions
- ✕A single 'ignore injection' system-prompt line mistaken for a defense
- ✕Sensitive tools callable purely because some text asked
- ✕No injection tests, so defenses are assumed rather than demonstrated
Verify gate — prove this step works before continuing
Do not move on until every check is true. Add proof notes — a checked box alone is weak proof. Checks are manual by default; deploy/API probes live under “More verification tools” and do not auto-check boxes.
Do not continue if…
- !Treating web/file/tool content as trusted instructions
- !A single 'ignore injection' system-prompt line mistaken for a defense
- !Sensitive tools callable purely because some text asked
- !No injection tests, so defenses are assumed rather than demonstrated
Repair path — if this step fails
Use the Repair Prompt when a verify gate fails. Loop: Detected → Diagnosed → Repair issued → Changed → Retested → Resolved
Show repair prompt textShow
Everything got marked trusted. Re-apply the test: if the content's author is not you or the harness, it is untrusted - a file the user wrote last week can still contain a payload the user forgot about.
Your notes for this step
Definition of Done
Final route-level requirements. Manual checks — separate from per-step verify gates. Completing step gates does not auto-check these. Route completion is not a production-ready claim.