What Flows just did
Based on your request to build Dependency and Supply-Chain Scanning for Agents, Flows created 4 implementation stages and 12 checks.
You asked for: Build supply-chain controls into the agent: gate dependency additions, verify package existence and reputation, scan for vulnerabilities, and require review for new dependencies.. Flows generated 4 stages because the application requires Interception of dependency-adding actions (installs, manifest edits); Existence and reputation checks: the package is real, established, and not a typosquat; Vulnerability scanning of proposed and existing dependencies. Each stage tells your AI builder what to do, tests whether it actually worked, and gives a repair instruction when it fails. These checks are designed to catch: Letting the agent install anything it names, hallucinations included; Slopsquatting: installing a malicious lookalike of a real popular package; No vulnerability scanning, so known-CVE packages ship.
Example failure
The form reported success, but no database record was created.
What Flows does
Flows detects the failure, generates a repair instruction, reruns the test, and stores the passing evidence.
Stages — Plan → Build → Test → Fix → Prove → Ship
4 stages · 12 checks · progressive disclosure — open a stage for details
Copy to external builder
Copies a prompt for Claude/Cursor/etc. Records prompt_copied only — not execution, commits, or checks.
Execute through Oort
Requires Sign in with Oort + a provider connection (BYOK). Keys stay on Oort. A model name in the dropdown is not the same as a live connection.
Next
Check off: Installs and manifest/lockfile edits both caught
Add a proof note on each check — a checkbox alone is weak proof.
Probes & advanced tools are under “More verification tools”. Experience level: Settings.
Project (saved with proof)
Project binding: Unbound — complete project binding before trusting this run · missing repositoryUrl, repositoryStartCommit, environment, stack
More verification tools (probes, timeline, adapters)Show
App persistence (create → read → assert token)
Body template: {"probe":"{{token}}","title":"flows-probe-{{token}}"}. Needs CORS-readable public create/list endpoints (or inconclusive). Badge only when create→read→refresh finds the token (detects false success).
Two-account authorization (User B cannot see/change User A)
Authorization evidence source: Cross-account ownership test (trust level 5/6). These are not equivalent. Unauthenticated probe alone is weaker (source: unauthenticated API probe). Tokens stay in this browser session only — not uploaded to Flows servers.
Generated edge-case tests (review / approve)
- api_probe Create then refresh still shows the record
- api_probe Edit then refresh keeps the edit
- api_probe Delete then refresh removes the record
- api_probe Nonexistent record ID fails cleanly
- cross_account_probe Cross-user record identifier is rejected
Generated from this route’s signals — you approve; you do not invent security tests.
Content probe (GET body contains text)
In-product content probe reads response text when CORS allows — not full DOM/click automation. Playwright script is optional and external.
Proof strength
thin · 0/100
Heuristic from notes + probes + gates — not a production certification.
Verification adapters
- ● Deploy URL probe · idle
- ● API path probe · idle
- ● Authz probe (unauth → 401/403) · idle
- ● Browser persistence · idle
- ● App persistence (create→read) · idle
- ● Content / body text probe · idle
- ○ In-product Playwright DOM · not embedded (download external script)
Filled circles = available here. Empty = not shipped. Probes are not a production audit. Adapter docs
Step 1 of 4
Not startedIntercept dependency additions
Every new dependency is a trust decision - catch it at the source.
Flows keeps plan, checks, failures, and next steps connected
Your AI tool writes or changes the code
Repository grounds the plan only after inspect
Checks always carry a validation tier
How this plan was created
Plan from project details
Flows creates steps using the goal, requirements, stack, platform, and details you provide.
- Project description
- Selected template / route
- User-entered stack
- Constraints and notes
- Dependency and Supply-Chain Scanning for Agents
No repository inspection implied. Connect and inspect a codebase to ground steps in real files.
Codebase access
Checking GitHub…
Or paste a repository URL manually
Use these instructions in Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Emergent, or another builder.
Hook the dependency-adding actions. Identify every way the agent can add a dependency: package-manager install commands (pip install, npm/yarn add, etc.), direct edits to manifests (requirements.txt, package.json, pyproject, go.mod), and lockfile edits. Route these through a supply-chain gate before they take effect: parse out the package name(s) and version(s) being added, and pause for the checks (next steps) rather than executing immediately. Distinguish adding a NEW dependency (full gate) from updating an existing reviewed one (lighter path). Ensure no install path bypasses the gate - including the agent writing a manifest and running install as separate steps. Verify by having the agent attempt an install and confirming the gate intercepts it.
Project context
Copies the project goal, technical details, current step, previous progress, and checks so your AI tool understands what it is working on.
Expected after this step
All dependency-adding paths intercepted before taking effect.
Should not happen
- ✕Letting the agent install anything it names, hallucinations included
- ✕Slopsquatting: installing a malicious lookalike of a real popular package
- ✕No vulnerability scanning, so known-CVE packages ship
- ✕Manifest edited but lockfile not updated, so installs drift from review
Verify gate — prove this step works before continuing
Do not move on until every check is true. Add proof notes — a checked box alone is weak proof. Checks are manual by default; deploy/API probes live under “More verification tools” and do not auto-check boxes.
Do not continue if…
- !Letting the agent install anything it names, hallucinations included
- !Slopsquatting: installing a malicious lookalike of a real popular package
- !No vulnerability scanning, so known-CVE packages ship
- !Manifest edited but lockfile not updated, so installs drift from review
Repair path — if this step fails
Use the Repair Prompt when a verify gate fails. Loop: Detected → Diagnosed → Repair issued → Changed → Retested → Resolved
Show repair prompt textShow
The agent edited the manifest then installed, dodging the gate. Gate on the manifest/lockfile change too, not just the install command - and treat installing after a just-made manifest edit as the same reviewable event.
Your notes for this step
Definition of Done
Final route-level requirements. Manual checks — separate from per-step verify gates. Completing step gates does not auto-check these. Route completion is not a production-ready claim.