What Flows just did
Based on your request to build Audit Trails for Tool Calls, Flows created 4 implementation stages and 12 checks.
You asked for: Implement an audit trail for agent actions: a structured, append-only, tamper-evident record of every consequential tool call with full context, queryable for investigation.. Flows generated 4 stages because the application requires An audit record per consequential action: actor, action, arguments, authority, outcome, timestamp; Linkage to the triggering context: session, task, user request, and provenance; Append-only, tamper-evident storage (integrity chaining or a write-once store). Each stage tells your AI builder what to do, tests whether it actually worked, and gives a repair instruction when it fails. These checks are designed to catch: Logs that show the action but not who/why/what-authorized-it; Mutable logs an attacker (or the agent) could alter to hide actions; Audit records so verbose or so sparse they cannot answer real questions.
Example failure
The form reported success, but no database record was created.
What Flows does
Flows detects the failure, generates a repair instruction, reruns the test, and stores the passing evidence.
Stages — Plan → Build → Test → Fix → Prove → Ship
4 stages · 12 checks · progressive disclosure — open a stage for details
Copy to external builder
Copies a prompt for Claude/Cursor/etc. Records prompt_copied only — not execution, commits, or checks.
Execute through Oort
Requires Sign in with Oort + a provider connection (BYOK). Keys stay on Oort. A model name in the dropdown is not the same as a live connection.
Next
Check off: Consequential actions scoped; trivia excluded
Add a proof note on each check — a checkbox alone is weak proof.
Probes & advanced tools are under “More verification tools”. Experience level: Settings.
Project (saved with proof)
Project binding: Unbound — complete project binding before trusting this run · missing repositoryUrl, repositoryStartCommit, environment, stack
More verification tools (probes, timeline, adapters)Show
App persistence (create → read → assert token)
Body template: {"probe":"{{token}}","title":"flows-probe-{{token}}"}. Needs CORS-readable public create/list endpoints (or inconclusive). Badge only when create→read→refresh finds the token (detects false success).
Two-account authorization (User B cannot see/change User A)
Authorization evidence source: Cross-account ownership test (trust level 5/6). These are not equivalent. Unauthenticated probe alone is weaker (source: unauthenticated API probe). Tokens stay in this browser session only — not uploaded to Flows servers.
Generated edge-case tests (review / approve)
- api_probe Logged-out users cannot open protected pages
- api_probe Protected API rejects requests without credentials
- api_probe Expired session cannot mutate data
- browser_automation Logout in one tab invalidates mutations from another
- cross_account_probe User B cannot see or change User A’s data
- cross_account_probe Participant cannot call coach/admin endpoints
- cross_account_probe URL/body ID tampering cannot cross tenant boundary
- api_probe Create then refresh still shows the record
- api_probe Edit then refresh keeps the edit
- api_probe Delete then refresh removes the record
- api_probe Nonexistent record ID fails cleanly
- cross_account_probe Cross-user record identifier is rejected
Generated from this route’s signals — you approve; you do not invent security tests.
Content probe (GET body contains text)
In-product content probe reads response text when CORS allows — not full DOM/click automation. Playwright script is optional and external.
Proof strength
thin · 0/100
Heuristic from notes + probes + gates — not a production certification.
Verification adapters
- ● Deploy URL probe · idle
- ● API path probe · idle
- ● Authz probe (unauth → 401/403) · idle
- ● Browser persistence · idle
- ● App persistence (create→read) · idle
- ● Content / body text probe · idle
- ○ In-product Playwright DOM · not embedded (download external script)
Filled circles = available here. Empty = not shipped. Probes are not a production audit. Adapter docs
Step 1 of 4
Not startedDefine the audit record and scope
Decide what is auditable and what each record must answer.
Flows keeps plan, checks, failures, and next steps connected
Your AI tool writes or changes the code
Repository grounds the plan only after inspect
Checks always carry a validation tier
How this plan was created
Plan from project details
Flows creates steps using the goal, requirements, stack, platform, and details you provide.
- Project description
- Selected template / route
- User-entered stack
- Constraints and notes
- Audit Trails for Tool Calls
No repository inspection implied. Connect and inspect a codebase to ground steps in real files.
Codebase access
Checking GitHub…
Or paste a repository URL manually
Use these instructions in Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Emergent, or another builder.
Design the audit record. SCOPE: audit consequential actions - state mutations (writes, deletes), external effects (network calls, sends, spends), permission decisions, and security-relevant events (blocks, escalations); read-only trivia need not be audited (avoid drowning the trail). RECORD FIELDS: timestamp, actor (agent id + session), action (tool + operation), arguments (scrubbed, but specific - which file, which record), AUTHORITY (what permitted it: auto-allow tier, session grant, user approval with reference, or policy), triggering context (task id, the user request that led here, provenance/trust of any content involved), and OUTCOME (success/failure, effect summary). Define which fields are mandatory. The test: could an investigator answer who/what/when/why/outcome from one record plus its links?
Project context
Copies the project goal, technical details, current step, previous progress, and checks so your AI tool understands what it is working on.
Expected after this step
An audit record schema that captures authority and causation, not just action.
Should not happen
- ✕Logs that show the action but not who/why/what-authorized-it
- ✕Mutable logs an attacker (or the agent) could alter to hide actions
- ✕Audit records so verbose or so sparse they cannot answer real questions
- ✕No linkage between the action and the request/approval that caused it
Verify gate — prove this step works before continuing
Do not move on until every check is true. Add proof notes — a checked box alone is weak proof. Checks are manual by default; deploy/API probes live under “More verification tools” and do not auto-check boxes.
Do not continue if…
- !Logs that show the action but not who/why/what-authorized-it
- !Mutable logs an attacker (or the agent) could alter to hide actions
- !Audit records so verbose or so sparse they cannot answer real questions
- !No linkage between the action and the request/approval that caused it
Repair path — if this step fails
Use the Repair Prompt when a verify gate fails. Loop: Detected → Diagnosed → Repair issued → Changed → Retested → Resolved
Show repair prompt textShow
Records show what happened but not why it was allowed. Add the authority and triggering-request fields - an audit trail that cannot explain why an action was permitted is useless in an incident.
Your notes for this step
Definition of Done
Final route-level requirements. Manual checks — separate from per-step verify gates. Completing step gates does not auto-check these. Route completion is not a production-ready claim.